Insights

image of a traffic control center (for a mobility and transportation)

Introducing the Melrose Networks 90-Day Evaluation Programme

Melrose Networks has launched a structured 90-day evaluation programme enabling mobile network operators and government stakeholders to assess the feasibility of detecting cellular-connected drones using LTE and 5G control-plane signalling. The evaluation analyses standard S1AP and NGAP signalling without requiring modification to network infrastructure or access to user communications. Conducted within a defined geographic area, the programme measures detection performance, tracking capability, and false positive rates. Interested operators and agencies are invited to explore how mobile network signalling can support emerging counter-drone capabilities.

The Drone's Last Mile: Our Own Mobile Networks

Long-range attack drones may travel most of their route autonomously but could attach to local mobile networks as they approach a target, enabling telemetry, retargeting, limited control, and mission confirmation. This raises the possibility that civilian telecoms infrastructure could inadvertently support hostile operations. Mobile operators and governments may therefore need to consider signalling-level behavioural analysis, integration with airspace monitoring systems, rapid response frameworks, and closer cross-sector cooperation to identify and mitigate potential misuse of national mobile networks.

Signal Cloud Technical Primer

Signal Cloud enables mobile network operators to analyse LTE and 5G signalling data at scale while preserving subscriber privacy. An operator-side gateway decodes signalling, filters parameters, and anonymises identifiers before securely streaming structured events to a cloud analytics platform. The system stores signalling activity and applies behavioural analytics to detect anomalies, mobility patterns, and operational insights. By transforming control-plane signalling into structured intelligence, Signal Cloud supports applications such as network optimisation, drone detection, border situational awareness, and large-scale mobility analysis across entire mobile networks.

Co-Channel Interference Effect of High-Altutude Drone

A high-altitude cellular-connected drone can establish line-of-sight to many base stations simultaneously, including distant cells that reuse the same spectrum. Its uplink transmissions may therefore be received by multiple co-channel cells, raising the interference floor and degrading uplink decoding for terrestrial users through increased HARQ retransmissions and reduced throughput. The drone itself may experience downlink interference from several visible base stations, reducing SINR and link quality. As the drone moves, this interference footprint shifts geographically and can be detected through signalling analysis of S1AP or NGAP.

Narva as an Early Warning Frontier for Drone Incursions into Estonia

The Estonian border city of Narva sits directly opposite Russia and represents one of NATO’s most exposed frontiers. Small drones launched from across the border could plausibly enter Estonian airspace and conduct surveillance deeper into the country, particularly along the E20 corridor toward Tallinn and nearby infrastructure. Because small drones face strict limits on payload, power and space, lightweight 4G or 5G modems may be favoured for communications where coverage exists. If such drones connect to Estonian mobile networks, their signalling behaviour could reveal anomalous mobility patterns.

From Ukraine to Everywhere: The Next Phase of Drone Warfare

The war in Ukraine has accelerated drone innovation dramatically, compressing a decade of development into a few years. Drones have evolved from expensive, specialised aircraft into inexpensive, rapidly iterated, software defined systems operating at scale. Increasingly, they function as nodes within wider sensing and strike networks rather than standalone platforms. Connectivity is becoming multi path, combining satellite, mesh, cellular, and other links for resilience. Over the next five years, autonomy, cooperative operations, and adaptive electronic warfare are likely to become routine, with capabilities spreading globally to both state and non state actors.

Advanced Heuristics for Identifying and Tracking Airborne Devices in Mobile Networks

As drones increasingly use 4G and 5G networks for beyond visual line-of-sight operations, distinguishing them from ordinary mobile devices presents a growing challenge. This paper outlines a two-stage detection model. The methods discussed provide a layered, scalable approach for identifying airborne devices and strengthening airspace security using existing mobile network infrastructure.

4G LTE (and 5G) in BVLOS Drone Control

As beyond visual line-of-sight drone operations expand, 4G LTE has become a key enabler, offering wide-area coverage, reliable connectivity and seamless integration with cloud-based command systems. Unlike traditional short-range RF links, LTE supports long-distance control at significant altitudes, making it well suited to commercial, humanitarian and defence applications. However, reliance on public mobile networks introduces security, regulatory and strategic challenges, including cyber risks and potential misuse. As adoption grows, securing LTE-based command-and-control links and strengthening oversight will be essential to ensure safe, resilient and accountable integration into shared airspace.

Non-Kinetic Options for Drone Countermeasures (CUAS): The MAVLink Exposure in Mobile Networks

MAVLink is widely used across the drone ecosystem, but many deployments lack mandatory encryption and strong authentication, exposing command-and-control traffic to interception or manipulation—particularly when carried over 4G or 5G networks. When unprotected MAVLink is transmitted across mobile operator infrastructure, authorised analysis of signalling and data flows can, in theory, enable detection, correlation and situational awareness of drone sessions. Under narrow technical conditions, weaknesses in unauthenticated links may even create a conceptual non-kinetic intervention option. The broader implication is clear: securing MAVLink with proper authentication and encrypted transport is essential as BVLOS drones increasingly rely on public cellular networks.

Modern Air Defence Must Include Mobile Network Intelligence

The growing use of drones in hybrid warfare has exposed a critical vulnerability: hostile systems exploiting civilian LTE and 5G networks for command, control and surveillance. By using ordinary SIM cards, drones can blend into national infrastructure while operating beyond visual line of sight, often deep inside sovereign airspace. Recent incidents across Ukraine and NATO states highlight the urgency of the threat. Governments must assess unintended airborne network coverage and treat telecom infrastructure as a defensive sensor layer. Through behavioural and signalling analysis, mobile networks can provide early warning, attribution and a new layer of air defence.